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TEXT OVER INTENT AND THE DEMISE OF
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The following is the transcript of a 2016 Federalist Society panel
entitled: Text Over Intent and the Demise of Legislative History. The panel
originally occurred on November 17, 2016 during the National Lawyers
Convention in Washington, D.C. The participants were: Prof. Thomas W.
Merrill, Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law, Columbia Law School;
Prof. Michael S. Paulsen, Distinguished University Chair and Professor,
University of St. Thomas School of Law; Prof. Saikrishna Prakash, James
Monroe Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of
Law; Prof. Lawrence B. Solum, Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center. The moderator was the Hon. Sandra
Segal Ikuta, Judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

[RECORDING BEGINS]

Hon. Judge Sandra Ikuta: My name is Sandra Ikuta, I am ajudge from
the Ninth Circuit.' It's a great pleasure and honor to be here. Justice Scalia
once famously compared legislative history to entering a crowded cocktail
party and looking for one's friends, and although it's a little bit early to get
started on the cocktails, I'm very happy to see many old and new friends here
gathering to consider the legacy of a celebrated jurist and a brilliant legal
mind.2 So, first, please join me in welcoming our panel. I have Professor
Tom Merrill of the Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law at Columbia Law
School; Professor Sai Prakash, James Monroe Distinguished Professor of
Law at the University of Virginia; Professor Lawrence Solum, Carmack
Waterhouse Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center; and
Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen, Distinguished University Chair and
Professor at the University of St. Thomas.
As the title of our panel indicates, we're here to discuss text over
intent and the demise of legislative history. Let me start with a simple
question, what difference does it make whether judges interpret statutes based
on their actual text and original public meaning or whether judges take into
1 UNITED STATES COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, THE JUDGES OF THIS COURT IN ORDER OF
(last
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view seniorityjlist.php?pk_id=0000000035
SENIORITY,

visited Sept. 25, 2017).
2 Michael C. Dorf, A Unanimous Supreme Court Decision on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
HighlightsOngoing Divisions Over Legislative History (Jun. 2, 2010), http://supreme.findlaw.com/legalcommentary/a-unanimous-supreme-court-decision-on-the-foreign-sovereign-immunities-act-highlightsongoing-divisions-over-legislative-history.html.
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account the law's legislative history? According to Justice Scalia, it makes
an enormous difference. Nothing less than the rule of law itself is at stake.
For Justice Scalia the text of the statute is the law. He said, "We are bound
not by the intent of our legislators, but by the laws which they enacted. 3 By
contrast, ifjudges are free to pursue unexpressed legislative intents, there's an
enormous risk that judges will pursue their own objectives and desires. As
Justice Scalia the psychologist put it, "When you are told to decide, not on the
basis of what the legislature said, but on the basis of what it meant,...
[surely], your best shot at figuring out what the legislature meant is to ask
yourself what a wise and intelligent person should have meant; and that [of
course] will [] bring you to the conclusion that the law means what you think
it ought to mean." 4 For that reason Justice Scalia argued, "The... [use] of
legislative history ...

has facilitated rather than deterred decisions that are

based upon the courts' policy preferences, rather than neutral principles of
law"5 and this, Justice Scalia concluded, is directly contrary to our great
American ideal, a government of law, not of man.6 And Justice Scalia was
not discouraged from this view by the fact that Congress sometimes writes
terrible laws. Justice Scalia explained, "If you're dealing with an inane statute
you are duty bound to produce an inane result" 7 or as he put it even more
succinctly, "garbage in, garbage out."8
There is no doubt that Justice Scalia's fierce adherence to this view
had a tremendous impact on the Supreme Court. As you heard from Justice
Alito, before Justice Scalia took his seat at the court in 1986, justices adhered
to what has recently been called, the Holy Trinity approach where the court
thought that compelling legislative history was more important than the text
of the statute itself.9 But Justice Scalia's presence on the court would change
this longstanding practice. Just a few months after Justice Scalia was elevated
from the DC Circuit, he wrote a concurrence in a case called INS v. CardozaFonseca that would ultimately change the framework for statutory
interpretation. 10 Justice Scalia agreed with the majority's conclusion that the
Ninth Circuit had gotten it right in its interpretation of an immigration statute,
but he refused tojoin the majority's opinion because that included the concept
that compelling legislative history could overrule the plain statutory
' Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, JudicialAdherence to the Text of our Basic Law: A Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE, U.S.A. (Sept. 5, 2003),
http://www.proconservative.net/PCVol5 Is225 ScaliaTheoryConstllnterpretation.shtml.
4 ANTONIN SCAL1A, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 18 (Amy

Gutmann ed-, 1997).
5 Id at35.
6 Enrique Schaerer, Justice Scalia and the ProperRole of a Judge, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY (Mar.
7, 2016), https://www.fed-soc.org/blog/dctail/justice-scalia-and-the-proper-role-of-a-judge.
7 Q&A with Justice Antonin Scalia, C-SPAN (Jul. 9, 2012), https://www.c-span.org/video/transcript
/?id=8335.
8

Id.

Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
'0INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-55 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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language. 1 He said, "[w]here the language of the law is clear, we're not free
to replace it with unenacted legislative intent" 12 and this pattern that Justice
Scalia started in Cardoza-Fonseca continued the rest of his career. I don't
mean agreeing with the Ninth Circuit of course. According to a law review
article published in 1990, during the period from 1987, when he first wrote
Cardoza-Fonseca, until 1989, just two years later, Justice Scalia wrote 14
13
separate opinions criticizing the majority for relying on legislative history.
The 1999 law review article noted that Justice Scalia's approach, if adopted,
would represent a significant change in the way the court writes its statutory
interpretation decisions and probably even the way the court conceptualizes
its role in interpreting statutes. 4 The subsequent decades, of course, showed
that Justice Scalia's strong point of view and powerful pen changed statutory
interpretation and the course of Court history. As a law review article
complained in 2008, in the face of Justice Scalia's fervent opposition to
legislative history, liberal justices since 1986 have opted not to rely on that
resources for certain types of cases. 5 Terming this the 'Scalia Effect', the
article speculated it resulted from Justices drafting their opinion strategically
in order to get Justice Scalia to join. 6
I can actually give some anecdotal support for this speculation. I
clerked for Justice O'Connor in OT '89 and I certainly remember flooding the
Supreme Court librarians with requests for old dictionaries so we could look
up the words and old statutes all to try to get Justice Scalia to join our boss's
opinions. The shift from legislative history to statutory texts is one of Justice
Scalia's legacies. Just recently Justice Kagan pronounced, "I think we're all
textualists now in a way that was just not remotely true when Justice Scalia
joined the bench."' 7 But is that really true? Didn't the court just hold that the
Federal Government is a State in King v. Burwell? 8 For those of you who
don't remember, that was the case holding that tax credits were available for
health insurance purchased from Federally established exchanges, even
though the act itself only allowed tax credit for exchanges established by the
State. 9 As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, "[w]ho would ever have
dreamt that 'Exchange established by the State' means 'Exchange established
by the State or the Federal Government'?" 20 And there are other signs that
I

Id. at 452.
Id. at 453.
"3 William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 651 n.116 (1989).
14 Id. at 624.
" James J. Brudney and Corey Distlear, Liberal Justices' Reliance on Legislative History, 29
BERKLEY J. EMPL. & LAB. L. 117, 121-22 (2008).
16 Id
"7 Justice Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialoguewith Justice Kagan on the Reading of Statutes,
12

HARVARD LAW TODAY (Nov. 17, 2015, 8:28-39), https://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-

discusses-statutory-interpretation/.
11 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 2497.
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so-called purposive reasoning, another term for legislative intent, is making a
comeback. The court recently held that a fish is not a tangible object in Yates
v. United States.2 Similarly, the court held in Bond v. United States that a
toxic chemical isn't a toxic chemical when it's used to poison your former
best friend who's now your husband's mistress.22 So, the question arises, will
Justice Scalia's textualist legacy endure as the court changes? Or, to
paraphrase Justice Scalia's famous remarks in a different context, must we
say, "like some ghoul in a late night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its
grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried,
[legislative history] stalks our [Supreme Court] jurisprudence once again."23
I look forward to discussing these questions and more with our panel. We'll
start with Professor Merrill and we'll have time for questions at the end.
Prof. Thomas Merrill: Thank you very much Judge. It is indeed a
privilege and honor to speak at this convention honoring the memory and the
legacy of Justice Scalia. I'm a great admirer of him and certainly he
influenced my thinking on a variety of topics. Sometimes I agreed, sometimes
I disagreed. But always, he was tremendously important in the development
of my own thinking about public law. I think Justice Scalia's great legacy,
others have alluded to this already, is that he was very concerned with
questions of legal method. Most judges are eclectic, or maybe a better word
is ecumenical, when it comes to questions of legal method. They will use
one method in one case, a different method in another case. It's a question of
what fits or perhaps what produces the correct result. Justice Scalia obviously
cared about results. But he also cared very passionately about method, and
frequently his concerns about method would override his conception of what
one would imagine he thought the best result would be in a case. We've
already heard about his influence on constitutional interpretation and
administrative law. The focus of this panel is on statutory interpretation, and
so, that's what I will focus on as well.
Both Justice Alito in his marvelous speech and Judge Ikuta briefly
alluded to the fact that Justice Scalia did not believe in purposive
interpretation. I will dissent from that; I don't think that's quite right. Justice
Scalia said repeatedly that in interpreting the words of the text, that you
always have to take into account the context in which the words are used. Of
course, he disagreed with the search for subjective intentions of the
legislature. But in saying that you have to consider the context basically what
he meant was that you have to take into account the obvious purpose for which
the words are being used. As he wrote in his Tanner Lecture at Princeton,
Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1088-89 (2015).
Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct 2077, 2093 (2014).
3 Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist, 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993).

21
22
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which I think is his most carefully prepared and thought-out exposition of his
views about interpretation, "[t]he import of the language depends upon its
context, which includes the occasion for, and hence the evident purpose of,
its utterance."24 So, I think you have to regard Justice Scalia as, ultimately,
not disagreeing with purposive interpretation, but rather, disagreeing with the
use of legislative history in trying to ascertain the meaning of the text of a
statute.
Here, I think his legacy was profound. Others have already described
how, before Justice Scalia joined the Court, it was routine to read opinions
that rummaged through all sorts of legislative history, looking for little
snippets here and there that might support some kind of conception of what
Congress intended when it passed the statute. Justice Scalia, as the Judge
described, engaged in relentless criticism of this approach, and in so doing,
had an enormous effect on reducing the use of legislative history. I think
today its appearance in Supreme Court opinions is very episodic, and when it
does appear, it appears in an apologetic sort of way. For one person to have
had this kind of transformative effect on jurisprudence is truly astonishing.
Justice Scalia gave three reasons, as I see it, for discarding legislative,
history. I think one of them is unsound; I think one of them is sound but
perhaps subject to qualification; and I think the third reason is compelling.
The unsound reason is that using legislative history is
unconstitutional. The argument, which is mentioned by Judge Easterbrook in
the video tribute, is that snippets of legislative history don't go through the
Article I process of bicameral approval and presentment to the President.
Hence, it's wrong to elevate these snippets of legislative history to the status
of law; they are not law; they are just chatter in the legislative process. This
is all true. But, typically, at least when used correctly, legislative history is
not used to override the text. I would freely agree that if the text is clear and
legislative history is being used to determine a meaning different from what
the text says, that's impermissible and that violates the Constitution. But
typically, legislative history is used to resolve genuine ambiguities in statutes,
situations where it's unclear what the statute means. So, the proper use of
legislative history is as an interpretive aid, not something to override
Congress's legislated actions. If you think about it, courts use all sorts of
interpretive aides to interpret statutes, none of which have gone through the
bicameral and presentment process. Justice Scalia, of course, was very fond
of dictionaries, but dictionaries have not been approved by Congress and have
not been signed by the President. Neither have the canons of interpretation,
nor the common law meanings of words, the rules of grammar and so on and
so forth. All these things are freely used by Judges, including Justice Scalia,
24 Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation:FederalCourts and the Law 144 (Amy Gutman ed.,

1997).
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to interpret ambiguous statutes; none of them have been approved by
Congress and the President, and yet no one thinks that they're
unconstitutional. So, used properly, as a way of interpreting ambiguous
statutes, I don't think that using legislative history violates the Constitution.
The second argument is that legislative history is subject to
manipulation. I think this is a sound argument. It's probably the case that
Madison's notes or Farrand's collation of the debates on the Constitution are
not prone to manipulation, because those deliberations were generated at a
time when no one thought that courts would use legislative history or
constitutional history in interpreting a text. But, starting in the 1940's, as a
recent article by Nick Parrillo at Yale documents in great detail, New Deal
lawyers engaged in a process of deliberately inserting commentary in the
legislative history of the statutes they were drafting for Congress.25 Then,
they would appear in court and cite this legislative history to tell courts what
the statutes meant.2 6 This was a form of blatant manipulation, and it was
present at the origins of the use of legislative history in statutory
interpretation. Justice Scalia rightly perceived that this was a serious concern.
Unlike dictionaries, unlike canons of interpretation, unlike rules of grammar,
and so forth, over which Congress has no say, subunits of Congress or
members of Congress obviously are in control of snippets of legislative
history. So, once courts start taking legislative history into account, there's a
great temptation to manipulate by planting little dialogues or colloquies,
which are designed to influence the courts in the way in which they interpret
statutes. So, I think this is a valid point.
To be sure, the point is perhaps overstated or subject to rebuttal. One
question is, what is the ratio of sincere attempts by legislators to persuade
their colleagues to vote for a particular measure versus blatant attempts to
manipulate courts? If the ratio of sincerity to manipulation were very high,
then throwing out all legislative history would be a kind of dramatic
prophylactic rule that might be questionable. We don't know what the ratio
is; no one has been able to do a study of this. So, it's a matter of some
speculation as to how much deceit is going on, as opposed to how much
sincere advocacy in the legislative process. Another objection to the
manipulation concern is that judges are not idiots. If the adversarial process
works as it's supposed to work, if one side is trying to manipulate the court
by citing legislative history, the other side can point out that the other side is
trying to manipulate the court, that the legislative history is really just potted
legislative history and that it is not a sincere attempt by one member of
Congress to persuade the others. So, there's sort of a built in way in which
this manipulation can, perhaps, be dampened down. I don't think that's
2' Nick R. Parrillo, Article: Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the
Judiciary,and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890-1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 380 (Nov. 2013).
26 Id.
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completely reassuring. I think, in the 1970's, we got into a situation where
one side was trying to manipulate and the other side was trying to countermanipulate, and so maybe the manipulation concern is a serious one. Again,
it's an empirical question as to whether or not it's worthwhile to throw out all
legislative history based on the concern that some successful manipulation is
going on. The problem is, we don't know how much.
There is a third argument against legislative history. Justice Scalia
did not advance this as often as he talked about the constitutional problem or
the manipulation problem, but I think it is both a sound and compelling
argument for doing away with legislative history. This is, to put the argument
in one word, drawing on legislative history is "inefficient." As Justice Scalia
put it in his Tanner lectures, "[t]he most immediate and tangible change the
abandonment of legislative history would effect is this: Judges, lawyers, and
clients will be saved an enormous amount of time and expense."27 Now,
again, this is an empirical proposition, it's impossible to prove it, and I don't
know of any studies that have been able to measure how much time, effort,
and money is spent doing legislative history versus the payoff from this effort.
But I strongly suspect that Justice Scalia was absolutely right about this. He
supported this proposition in his lecture by pointing to his time as Head of the
Office of Legal Counsel during the Ford Administration. Back then, of
course, legislative history was used in practically every case. So, the Office
of Legal Counsel had to devote enormous amounts of time to doing legislative
history research. Justice Scalia reported that most of this time was utterly
wasted. The attorneys would dredge through the legislative history, and they
wouldn't find anything on point. His explanation, which I think is entirely
plausible and persuasive, is that if a statute is ambiguous, it's unlikely that the
legislature or the staff spotted the ambiguity. Ambiguity usually emerges
over the course of time in the implementation of statutes. And so, looking for
a resolution of the ambiguity in legislative history is likely to come up with a
null set. This happens over and over again, and consequently a lot of time
and energy is wasted. I think Justice Scalia was correct about that.
I would go further and say that recent trends in the legislative process
have probably made this problem considerably worse. When Justice Scalia
was in the Office of Legal Counsel, Congress followed something called
"orderly process," in which a bill would be submitted to one house of
Congress. There would be hearings; then, there would be a markup by the
committee; then, there would be a committee report; then, the other chamber
would follow suit; and then, there would be a conference report. So, at least
you knew where to look in order to find relevant legislative history that might
shed light on the meaning of particular terms. This process has largely broken
down. What we now see are mega statutes that are patched together in a
27 Scalia, supra note 4, at 36.
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highly idiosyncratic fashion, none of which replicate any other. This makes
it extremely hard to do any kind of coherent legislative history research. Let
me give you one example: the Dodd Frank Financial Reform Act of 2010,28
which I had the misfortune of doing a little legislative history research about
recently in writing an article, was preceded, according to a compilation of
documents put together by the librarian of the Federal Reserve Board, by a
conference report. But the conference report says nothing about most of the
provisions that were ultimately adopted by the conference. There is no House
report and no Senate report. The Act was stitched together from 48 separate
bills, the final version of which emerged after 19 different steps in the
legislative process. The Senate held 39 relevant hearings, and the House held
55. Anyone who is condemned to trying to figure out the legislative history
of particular provisions of the Dodd Frank Act by plowing through this
material is to be pitied. Maybe orderly process will return to Congress; maybe
this is a transitory situation; but somehow, I doubt it. Part of the problem, of
course, is gridlock and the fact that Congress is narrowly divided, and
therefore, things like the Senate filibuster make it very difficult to get laws
passed through orderly process. But part of it is also the increase in
Congressional staff, the devotion of time to fundraising, and the role of social
media and interest groups. These and other factors mean that the old
fashioned orderly process that Congress followed is unlikely to be resurrected
anytime soon. So, I think changes in the way Congress operates that have
happened since the time when Justice Scalia was condemned to research
legislative history in the Office of Legal Counsel have made it even more
compelling that this is simply a gigantic waste of time. I think we should
applaud Justice Scalia for trying to put legislative history out of its misery,
and hopefully, the little mice that are coming back in these oral arguments,
that Justice Alito referred to, will not be allowed to propagate and multiply.
Thank you.

Hon. Judge Sandra Ikuta: So, we heard that legislative history use is
inefficient. We'll next hear from Professor Prakash.
Prof. Saikrishna Prakash: I want to begin by thanking the Federalist
Society for inviting me here today. I'm quite proud to be part of the panel. I
deeply admire Justice Scalia, and I was greatly saddened by his passing. For
some of my views on the Justice, I encourage you to look at a recent essay
posted on the Harvard Law Review forum site entitled A Fool for the Original
Constitution.2 9 It's a full-throated defense of the Justice's jurisprudence. I
28 DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION AcT, 12 U.S.C. 5301 (2010).
29 See generally, Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Response: A FoolForThe OriginalConsitution, 130
HARv. L. REV. 24 (Nov. 2016).
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should add that the Justice was always kind and gracious to me, but today, I'm
going to follow his admonition to say something that the audience disagrees
with: I'm going to defend the use of legislative history. I think if the Justice
were here today, I'm sure he would skewer me in various ways, and I would
squirm in various ways, but I think the case ought to be made for the use of
legislative history.
Let me begin with some data derived from the work of others,
particularly David Law and Mr. Zerring. The high mark use of legislative
history occurred in 1970's, well before Justice Scalia got on the court; and it's
been declining pretty much ever since. So, it started to decline even before
Justice Scalia got on the court, and of course, it continued while he was on
the court, but it has not declined to zero. Some Justices, quite sympathetic to
Justice Scalia's approach, have used legislative history, including Justice
Thomas, Justice Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts. The latter two actually
defended the use of legislative history before the Senate, despite the withering
criticism that Justice Scalia made against its use prior to their ascension to the
Supreme Court. So, if we define demise as the utter disuse of legislative
history, we're just not there yet, at least not at the Supreme Court. I think it's
more accurate to say that there has just been a decline in its use, and I think
thats been salutary. I think that Justices were using legislative history too
often, perhaps to confirm their preexisting biases or conclusions. I think this
amplifies Judge Leventhal's observation that the use of legislative history is
"the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the
heads of the guests for one's friends."3 ° Justices and Judges were looking at
legislative history to confirm their conclusions they had already reached for
other reasons. Yet, oddly enough, I think Justice Scalia's criticisms made the
use of legislative history more defensible because he demanded that everyone
make a more compelling case for their use.
Like some others, I think legislative history can provide context of
the sort that Professor Merrill mentioned in his remarks. I fully understand
that there will be some statements made up just so that they can influence
interpretation later on, and if we believe that systematically occurs, that's a
good reason for not consulting the legislative history that is results are
generated in that sort of environment. It's not necessarily a reason not to
consult legislative history generated in prior environments where there was
no systematic attempt to cook the record, so to speak, and I think we can see
this in other areas. Let's move beyond statutes and consider treaties in the
Constitution. With respect to the Constitution, Justice Scalia engaged in a
form of legislative history. He cited the Federalist Papers quite frequently.
In his famous case called Printz v. United States, involving whether or not the
Federal government could commandeer chief State law enforcement officers
3 Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993).
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to enforce Federal law, he cites the Federalist Papers both to make his point
that Congress cannot do that and to reject Justice Souter's argument that
commandeering of executive branch officials was permissible.3
Now, of course, again, the Federalist Papers were never voted on by
the Philadelphia Convention; they were never voted on by the various State
conventions; in fact, they were written after votes in several state conventions.
So, the same sort of argument that's been made, sort of the constitutional
argument that's been made against legislative history, could be made against
the Federalist Papers, and Farrand's records, and Elliot's Debates, and all the
pamphlets and other writings that were written at the time of the Constitution's
creation and ratification, and I think the same sort of argument can be made
with respect to treaties. In Medellin v. Texas, a case involving whether or not
President Bush could order the state courts to reopen certain criminal cases,
Chief Justice Roberts declared that the court traditionally looked at text,
background, negotiating and drafting history, and post-enactment history,
namely, the practices of the nation-states.32 Justice Scalia wholly joined this
opinion, and in fact, this made sense because Chief Justice Roberts was
quoting and citing a Justice Scalia opinion on the use of history in the context
of treaty making, and that case is Zicherman v. Korean Airlines.33 In
Zicherman, Scalia says, "[w]e have traditionally considered as aids to its
interpretation negotiating and drafting history34 (travaux prrparatoirs) and the
postratification understanding of the contracting parties."3 5 I think that
suggests that Justice Scalia did not have a categorical aversion to the use of
legislative history, certainly not with respect to Constitutions, certainly not
with respect to treaties.
So, I view legislative history as a traditional tool of statutory
interpretation, no more problematic as a theoretical matter than the use of
dictionaries or the use of nonobvious canons of construction that the courts
cite to from time to time. As Tom just pointed out, none of those dictionaries
and none of those canons of construction have gone through bicameralism
and presentment, but the courts use them, nonetheless, and I think we kind of
assume that Congress understands that the courts will use them. I agree,
Congress could, tomorrow, require the Court to use conference reports, etc.,
to understand and so, the real question is just what is the default rule. Is the
default rule that you can't use them or that you can? I think Justice Scalia did
us a service by ensuring that we weren't as reliant on legislative history as we
were in the past. Citizens of Overton Park v. Volpewas, sort of a crazy
opinion because it starts with legislative history, but I don't think it makes
31 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 910-24 (1997).

2 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 523 (2008).

31 Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217 (1996).
34 Id. at
226.
35 Id.
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sense to say you should not use it at all, I want to end by saying, that
sometimes, it is okay to look out over a room and find your friends.36 Thank
you.
Hon. Judge Sandra Ikuta: We've heard from Professor Prakash that
it's okay to use legislative history because all of our friends are using it. Now
we'll hear from Professor Solum.
Prof. Lawrence Solum: Thank you so much. It's a great pleasure to
be here and an honor to be here on this occasion. So, my remarks will follow
directly from ideas expressed by Tom Merrill and Sai Prakash, and I want to
investigate the relationship between Justice Scalia's views about
constitutional interpretation and his views about statutory interpretation.
Professor Randy Bamett, who's in the room, and I, together, run an
originalism boot camp each summer, and Justice Scalia was gracious enough
to meet with our students at every session of the boot camp, as long as he was
alive. We asked him why he said, in the famous OLC speech, that we should
move away from original intent and to original public meaning, and he said,
"Well, I had a theory of statutory interpretation, and so, I was aware of the
problems with trying to divine intent." So, it just seemed obvious to Justice
Scalia that our approach to constitutional interpretation should mesh with our
approach to statutory interpretation. In preparation for this event, I slogged
through the 101 opinions that appear on Westlaw when you search for the
phrase, "legislative history" and the author "Judge Antonin Scalia." So, one
or two things become apparent: Justice Scalia almost never relied on
legislative history in a decisive way in an opinion that he wrote, although he
did use legislative history in several opinions; and over and over and over
again Justice Scalia said that the use of legislative history is inappropriate in
this case because there is no ambiguity to resolve, and that's very important.
Now, that brings us to an interesting question, which is, what do we mean by
ambiguity? I think there is a hidden ambiguity in the word "ambiguity" that
reflects an ambiguity in the way we use legislative history. So, I'm going to
come back to that question, but before I do, I want to back up.
There are, I think, three rival approaches to statutory interpretation.
One of these we sometimes call "purposivism," but that label is somewhat
misleading. It is associated with Professors Hart and Wexler and the legal
process school of the 1950's. It refers to objective purposes, or if we are a
When judges
little less charitable, judge-manufactured purposes.
might use
they
manufacture purposes, they try to give them a pedigree, and
legislative history for that purpose. That is not a legitimate use of legislative
' See generally, Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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history according to Justice Scalia, because that kind of purposivism is just
legislation from the bench. Intentionalism... sometimes people talk about
intent and purpose as if they were one thing, but intentionalism is the view
that we are searching for the will of Congress, for what it was Congress
wanted the statute to do in operation, and again, Justice Scalia would say that
legislative history is inappropriate if used for those purposes. Why in that
way? Why? Because the will of Congress was not enacted as a statute.
Congress enacted - went through the formalities of bicameralism and
presentment - only the text of the statute, not the mental states of the
congressmen.
The third approach, of course, is textualism, plain meaning textualism
being Justice Scalia's preferred theory. Does intent have a role to play in a
textualist approach to statutory interpretation? I think that it does, and it can,
but that role is very, very limited. Sometimes statutes use words that are
ambiguous, in the sense that it's a word that can have more than one meaning;
famous example, the bank of a river or the bank that serves as a financial
institution. It's rare that you can't resolve ambiguity from the text of the
statute itself because usually the text itself provides sufficient context to
resolve ambiguities, but if it does not, then there is nothing inconsistent with
textualism in looking to other evidence of context in order to resolve the
ambiguity. That use of legislative history, although very rare, is fully
consistent with Justice Scalia's view of textualist statutory interpretation. One
last point, and it goes to Professor Merrill's discussion of the argument that
some use of legislative history is unconstitutional, unlike Professor Merrill, I
think that this argument is correct and that it provides the primary basis for
the exclusion of a certain way of using legislative history. So, in order to get
at this, we need to distinguish between the activity of discovering the meaning
of the constitutional text, the constitutional interpretation, and the activity of
putting the constitutional text into legal-effect construction. It is a very old
distinction, going back to 1839. Its chief proponent in the 20th century was
Corb, and it was used by Wigiore, Williston, and others in the first half of
the 20th century. Legislative history can play a role in interpretation if that
role is limited to determining the meaning of the text, but when legislative
history is used as a tool for adopting constructions that alter or override the
meaning of the text, then it is illegitimate; then it is judicial legislation; then
it is privileging something that was not enacted as law over that which was
enacted as law, and it is perfectly reasonable to view that as unconstitutional.
Thank you.

Hon. Judge Sandra Ikuta: Okay. So, we've heard that it's okay to use
legislative history to resolve real ambiguities, though I must say that judges
are famous for plucking ambiguity out of the jaws of clarity. Now we'll hear
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from Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen.

Prof. Michael Stokes Paulsen: Thank you. I'm greatly honored to be
part of this conference in honor of Justice Scalia. I've given my own tribute
to him in an online article on The Public Discourse website called, "The
Supreme Greatness of Justice Antonin Scalia."37 I really think he is one of
the five greatest, most important Supreme Court Justices in the history of the
nation and clearly the most influential and important Justice of the past 50
years.
I, unlike some others, didn't know Justice Scalia personally. I shared
two meals with him 30 years apart, in group settings. The first was when he
was a judge, or one out of a panel of judges, in my final moot court round
when I was a law student, and I had the great good fortune of sitting next to
him at dinner and bathing in his wit, grace, charm, and intellect. Then, the
next meal I shared with him was just last fall, about a year ago, when Justice
Scalia came to Minneapolis and spoke at my law school, University of St.
Thomas, and just regaled us with stories.
In between those 32 years, I knew Justice Scalia the way most of us
came to know him, through his writings. I became something of a "devotee,"
or even a "disciple," of the great Justice Antonin Scalia. So, I'm greatly
honored to be here.
What I'm going to do in my 10 minutes is try to back up and give you
two broader propositions that I think are consistent with Justice Scalia's
jurisprudence. The title I've given my remarks is "The Interpretive Force of
What is the legitimate
Constitutional and Statutory Legislative History."
interpretation?
statutory
force of legislative history in both constitutional and
My first point is that the tasks of constitutional interpretation and
statutory interpretation are almost exactly the same - or very, very closely
analogous - and as a corollary, the rightful role of resort to legislative history
is, or should be, almost exactly parallel in constitutional and statutory
interpretation. There are some refinements and there are differences, but
basically, it is the same enterprise, and Scalia thought it was the same
enterprise. The second point I'll make is that there is a simple and logical
reason-it's been alluded to already-why certain types of constitutional
legislative history (early evidence of the original meaning) tends to be more
reliable and useful than statutory legislative history today, and why it is,
therefore, more appropriate to resort to constitutional legislative history than
modem statutory legislative history. This is a position that I think also is fully
consistent with what Justice Scalia said. It explains why you can rely on your
" Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Supreme Greatness of Justice2 Antonin Scalia, PUBLIC DISCOURSE,
(Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.con/2016/03/1661 /.
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well-worn, tattered, much marked-up copy of the Federalist Papers in a way
that you cannot rely on committee reports put into bills in the 1970's.
So, my first proposition-that the tasks of constitutional
interpretation and statutory interpretation are essentially the same-requires
me to back up just a little bit and give you a broad theory of everything you
need to know about textual interpretation of written, authoritative legal texts!
I think that any theory of constitutional interpretation and statutory
interpretation ultimately addresses four big questions.
The first question is just what is the meaning of the text, the objective
original meaning of the words. What does the text actually say? What is its
meaning? How do we interpret it? How do we exegete the meaning of a text?
The second question is whether we should follow this text, which in
some ways is a pre-political decision as to whether or not you will treat a legal
text as authoritative. That's the question of what you do with the meaning of
the text once you have found it.
The third big question is, what do we do when meaning, so to speak,
runs out. How do you resolve questions of ambiguity or uncertainty? What
are your default rules when the text doesn't answer something? Larry Solum
is the best in terms of explicating the theory behind that.
Then, the fourth big question in any theory of interpretation is, who
interprets the text? Who interprets a provision or clause in the constitutional
context? What is the scope of judicial authority? Do the other branches of
government have an independent power of independent constitutional
interpretation?
In statutory interpretation, again, all of these are closely analogous.
Now, the question of the use of constitutional legislative history and
legislative-legislative history is basically a question of what is its rightful role
in interpreting or aiding in the interpretation of the text itself- the meaning
of the text itself. My proposition - which I think is consistent with what
several people have said, and is consistent with Justice Scalia's position - is
that, in constitutional interpretation, if you're a good originalist-textualist, you
do not use legislative history, including the Federalist Papers, in order to
displace or modify what would otherwise be the meaning of the text. Instead,
you look sometimes to legislative history for its usefulness in displaying or
clarifying the meaning of the words of the text. You are not looking for
subjective intentions or expectations when you read Madison, Hamilton, or
any of the other founding documents. You are, instead, looking to see how
they were using words and the meaning of the words. In other words, like a
dictionary, the Federalist Papers is sort of a concordance: it operates and
serves a dictionary function, explaining the meanings of words and concepts
within the historical and linguistic context of the time.
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So, legislative history in Constitutional interpretation is potentiallyprobative, second-best evidence of objective textual meaning. You look to
the history, into the historical documents, to provide you with help, with
dictionary help, in understanding what is theoretically the objective meaning
of the words. Scalia was willing to do this, and he would do this both in a
constitutional legislative-history context and in a legislative-legislative
history context.
In preparation for this this talk, I went through some of Scalia's law
review articles, and one of his more recent ones was one that was sort of a coauthored colloquy with a former clerk of his and friend of mine, John
Manning, who's now Dean of the Harvard Law School. It appears in the
George Washington Law Review. Scalia said this: "You forget that I don't
care what the legislators intended. I care what the fair meaning of this word
is."38 Then he goes on to say, "[a]nd by the way, I don't object to all uses of
legislative history. If you want to use it to just show that a word could bear a
particular meaning-if you want to bring forward floor debate to show that a'
word is sometimes used in a certain sense-that's okay. I don't mind using
legislative history just to show that a word could mean a certain thing. We
are trying to ascertain how a reasonable person uses language, and the way
legislators use language is some evidence of that, though perhaps not as
persuasive evidence as a dictionary."39
That is using legislative history as informative rather than authoritative.
You use it to exegete the meaning of words, not to control or spin interpretation.
Now, the core problem with the use of legislative history is reliability. That's the
core problem---reliability-and that's a problem to a certain extent with both
constitutional legislative history and legislative-legislative history, but they are
problems of varying degrees because of the different circumstances. The huge
problem with the modem use of legislative history in statutory interpretation is
that it's massively unreliable--it's all spin; it's all gaming the system-and Scalia
was adamant about this, too. In that same interview, he says, "[M]y objection
goes beyond that. Legislative history is not just unlikely to reflect the genuine
purpose of Congress; it is increasingly likely to portray a phony purpose. The
more you use legislative history, the phonier it will become. Downtown
Washington law firms make it their business to create legislative history; that is a
regular part of their practice. They send up statements that can be read on the
floor or statements that can be inserted into committee reports. So the more we
use it, the less genuine it is. It's not that we use it because it's there. It's there
because we use it.

'4

3 The Honorable Antonin Scalia and John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional
Interpretation, 80 GEORGE WASH. L. REv. 1610, 1616 (Nov. 2012), http://www.gwlr.org/wp-content
/uploads/2012/1 1/Scalia_Manning_80_6.pdf
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1612.
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So, I'm going to suggest - building on Scalia's proposition - what I

will call, sort of faux-immodestly, "Paulsen's Law," or "Paulsen's Paradox"
of legislative history. But it's really "Scalia's Law," and that is this: the more
you know that legislative history (either in a constitutional sense or a statutory
sense) might count as evidence of a textual meaning; the more that courts over
time show a willingness to look to such evidence; and the more sophisticated
a gamer you are, the greater the incentives will be to make and manufacture
legislative history, and the less reliable that legislative history will be. So,
here's Paulsen's Law: the more a legal interpretive system relies on legislative
history to determine textual meaning, the less reliable such evidence will
become because players learn the game and manipulate the evidence.
Similarly, the less aware deliberators, debaters, or drafters of legal language
are that they are, by their discussions, furnishing potentially probative
evidence of original meaning, textual meaning - the less self-conscious they
are that they are making legislative history that will affect interpretation - the
more reliable such evidence will tend to be.
Now, that is, in the main, why I think, and I've said in an article with
Vasan Kesavan some years ago, that the secret drafting history of the records
of the Constitutional Convention-which were not available to the ratifiers;
they were confidential and not meant to be published; and Madison's notes
weren't published until 1840-is actually, for that very reason, a fairly
reliable source of evidence for what the meaning actually was.41 There are
some problems with the documentary evidence and Mary Sarah Bilder has a
marvelous book called Madison's Hand, talking about the revisions that James
Madison made to his notes over time, and how they reflect evolutions in his
thinking. 42 But, to the extent he's faithfully recording the debates, the debaters
are not intentionally spinning because they are not thinking that they are
making legislative history. For precisely that reason, to the extent that the
debates reveal something about what they thought the concepts and meanings
of terms actually were, they are more reliable legislative history than statutory
legislative history ever can be today.
Hon. Judge Sandra Tkuta: So, now we know legislative history can be
mildly informative, but only if the legislators don't know anyone is listening.
We'll have some time for some questions, but while you're gathering up your
thoughts I'll take the moderator's privilege to start a round of questions, that's
particularly interesting to me. Justice Scalia was very concerned aboutjudges
using legislative history and other tools---context, purpose, and intent of the
legislators-to enact their own policy preferences. I hear from the panelists
41 Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret
DraftingHistory, 91 Geo. L.j. 1113 (2003).

42 See generally, MARY SARAH BILDER, Madison's Hand: Revising the ConstitutionalConvention

(Harv. Univ. Press, 2015).
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that legislative history can be okay if it doesn't go too far, if it's used
appropriately. But, how do you stop judges from doing that? Now, after King
v. Burwell, we are seeing advocates arguing that if you look at the whole
statute, clear language is actually ambiguous, and therefore, you can use
legislative history to change the meaning of "left" to "right" or "Federal" to
"State. ' 3 So, let me start with Professor Merrill. Given your view that as
long as the legislative history is sincere and not being manipulated, judges
can rely on it, where is the stopping place for judges? What is some rule that
would actually be enforceable?
Prof. Thomas Merrill: Thanks for that question. My position was not
that it's okay to use legislative history because judges can figure out when it's
phony and when it's not phony. My point was that the phony manipulation
point may be overstated because it's possible that judges might be able to
differentiate between phony and non-phony legislative history. My bottom
line is that we should not use legislative history at all, certainly in statutory
interpretation, simply because it greatly increases the cost of appellate and
trial-court litigation for gains that are probably not commensurate with those
costs. So, I would, on a kind of consequentialist utilitarian basis, throw it all
out. I'm simply saying that the manipulation concern, which a number of the
panelists have focused on, is an empirical question, an arguable question, and
another reason to throw out legislative history, but perhaps not as powerful as
a consequentialist one. I completely agree with you that once we let it in the
door, as we did during the 70's, then judges will run with it. It will give judges
more putty to play with in trying to reach results that they find congenial on
the basis of their own preferences.
Hon. Judge Sandra Ikuta: Professor Prakash.
Prof. Saikrishna Prakash: I think a lot of people criticize originalism
and say, look originalist judges can reach results that they want, the text is
manipulatable, and I think there is no theory of interpretation that will prevent
judges, willful judges, from doing what they want. Judge Ikuta, you
mentioned the Burwell case where the text seemed to suggest that the states
were the object and not the Federal government and the court ruled
otherwise." I think they could have done that whether or not they referenced
legislative history. So, I don't really know if legislative history really makes
it that much easier for a judge who really wants to get a particular result to

" See generally, King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
44 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492-93 (2015).
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reach that result. So, I guess, I question the predicate.
Hon. Judge Sandra Ikuta: Let me ask how you think a Judge would
have said that "State" means "State and Federal" without saying, "Here's the
context. Here's what Congress intended. That makes it ambiguous."
Prof. Saikrishna Prakash: Any textualist is going to say we've got to
look at the whole statute. We're not going to read a provision in isolation and
decide what it means. You've put me in the very difficult position of having
to defend a decision that I don't agree with. Ijust think, with all due respect
to you Judge Ikuta, judges at the Federal level have life tenure, and they can
pretty much do whatever they want while they're on the bench, right. That's
why Brutus said that they're independent of heaven and earth, and we
shouldn't be surprised if they sometimes flex their muscles and make
decisions that we think misread the statutes, treaties, and constitutions of the
United States, whether or not they're looking at legislative history. It's not as
if we were to banish the use of legislative history tomorrow there wouldn't be
manipulation and, sort of, rather odd claims about what the text of the
Constitution, statutes, and treaties of the United States mean. I don't want to
have to defend that decision to make my point.
Hon. Judge Sandra Ikuta: Well, most of us judges like to think there's
a fig leaf of reasoning and not just raw power. Professor Solum.
Prof. Lawrence Solum: So, I think that it is surely the case that ajudge
who's determined to legislate from the bench can find a way to put a fig leaf
on that exercise of legislative will. In fact, in King v. Burwell, on the blogs
at least, there was a whole argument about how the plain meaning of the
statute supported the interpretation that the Federal government was a State,
and that reasoning could have been employed by a judge with a straight face.
This is why it is so important to consider character in the selection of judges.
In order for originalism and plain meaning textualism to work, the judges who
apply those theories have to actually have the virtue of lawfulness. That is,
they must care about the law; they must care that their decisions reflect what
the statute says or what the Constitution originally meant, and not what they
would like to insert into the meaning of the statute. So, when we think about
selecting judges, we're not just thinking about competence, and we're not just
thinking about what theories the judge allows, even the most alive of living
constitutionalists can say at her confirmation hearing, "We are all originalists
now." The discernment of character really means you need to pay attention
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to the way that people act, and not just what they say.
Prof. Michael Stokes Paulsen: Just briefly, those of you who work on
statutory drafting, and if you ever were to engage in constitutional drafting,
realize how difficult it is to write a truly judge-proof text-the judge needs to
be running a sound interpretive program, a sound interpretive methodology.
It is true that the more things you let come into your interpretive model, the
greater the opportunities for manipulation. But, that would apply to a number
of other things, other doctrines that I've criticized including stare decisis.
Sometimes you're not just interpreting the statute, you're interpreting
interpretations of the statute, and you're interpreting distinctions of the
interpretations of the statute, and you're interpreting manipulations of the
distinctions of the interpretations of the statute, and pretty soon, you have
essentially unbridled discretion. I think the important thing is that whatever
the tools are that they be as clear as possible and that's-gosh-that is the
theme of Justice Scalia's 30 years on the court: rules, principles, avoiding
judicial discretion, except, to the extent that judicial discretion is actually
called for in this context of the authoritative written text.
Hon. Judge Sandra Ikuta: Thank you. Well, I'll throw the questions
open to the audience, does anyone have questions? I see one down here, yes.
Audience Question: I wanted to take Saikrishna's challenge to us that,
essentially, to have a relatively bright line exclusion of legislative intent or
legislative history, might, essentially, require that we break the tablets of the
Federalist Papers in the same motion or with the same rule. I'm wondering if
there might not be a scale of Burke-ian reliance interests when one looks at
the importation of that history and the public debate-although I understand
that several States did vote before some of that was published-and if there
might not be those interests that would defend the use of, properly or not,
venerated text that has long been used versus the idea of present day
assailment from the floor of the Senate.
Hon. Judge Sandra Ikuta: So, breaking the tablets of the Federalist
Papers goes against the Paulsen principle. Can we start with you?
Prof. Michael Stokes Paulsen: Yeah. I'm not sure that I have the
premise of the question exactly correct but I'll say some things that I think are
true, and we'll see if they're responsive. Okay. The use of constitutional or
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statutory legislative history, what use you make of it, depends on what
interpretive program you're running. If you're thinking that the relevant
evidence is contractual intentionalism, what people actually subjectively
believed, you will place a greater emphasis on these texts. If you are a
textualist, you will use the Federalist Papers, Madison's notes, and committee
reports on a house or Senate bill as evidence of the meaning of the words. My
sole proposition is that the Federalist Papers in general tend to be more
reliable evidence of original constitutional meaning than committee reports
do of actual statutory meaning. So, it kind of goes back to Tom Merrill's
point, that there is a question of the manipulability of the evidence, how
probative it actually is in a certain context, and whether there are differences
in ability of judges to use different sources and discern when some sort of
history is manipulative and when it isn't. Is that sort of responsive?
Audience Member: Yeah.
Prof. Saikrishna Prakash: I guess, I'll say about the tablets: I love the
Federalist Papers; and I cite them all the time; and I enjoy when other people
cite them. But, I think it's a mistake to think that those papers were written
just to expounnd the meaning of the Constitution. They were written to ratify
the Constitution. They were the equivalent, in some sense, of floor debates
because these guys-they're notjust trying to dispassionately say, "Oh, here's
what the Constitution means"-they're trying to ratify the Constitution. It is
a piece of propaganda meant to convince people to vote for the Constitution.
So, they may be better than all the other things written at the time, but they're
still pieces of political propaganda, great pieces of political propaganda, and
I think I agree with Mike that there's a lot there that's actually true, but I think
there's also shading in there. I think Hamilton systematically discounts the
executive power; I think he systematically discounts the strength of the
Federal judiciary; and other people call him on it, and he tries to respond to
them, but it's not always clear that he's right. It's not clear that Mike Paulsen
would agree with every single claim about the Constitution that's found in the
Federalist Papers. I doubt it.

Hon. Judge Sandra Ikuta: Next question.
Audience Question: My question is primarily for Professor Paulsen
but also for the rest of the panel. Picking up on that distinction between
Constitutional legislative history and legislative-legislative history, how
much is the audience question doing the work in distinguishing between the
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sources? So, with traditional legislative-legislative history, the audience
typically has to legislate itself, either the whole body of the legislature or some
subset, a committee; whereas, with many constitutional legislative history
sources, especially the Federalist Papers and the anti-federalist writings to
which they responded, the audience was the American public at-large. So, if
the inquiry is public meaning, how much does that distinction play a role in
justifying the use of constitutional legislative history more frequently than the
use of legislative-legislative history?
Hon. Judge Sandra Ikuta: So, how does the audience affect the
Paulsen principle?
Prof. Michael Stokes Paulsen: Great question. I think that the
audience of much of modem statutory legislative history is not actually
persuading other members of Congress but is actually spin doctoring. The
purpose for many committee reports, floor statements, colloquies, is to affect
interpretation of the statute once it emerges and to get results out of courts.
The courts are the true audience; get a result out of courts that you couldn't
have gotten through the text of the statute because you didn't get it in the text
of the statute. I think that at the time that they were debating the Constitution
in Philadelphia and at the time they were writing the Federalist Papers, they
knew these documents would eventually become public or may become
public and the Federalist Papers were public advocacy pieces, but they're not
trying overtly to spin judicial interpretation. And in terms of what we mean
when we talk about "original public meaning," I don't think that a document
has to have been public at the time in order to be possibly probative evidence
of public meaning, in the sense that if s not a private idiosyncratic subjective
intention, but this was the public understanding of the meaning of the words.
So, the very fact that the Convention Records weren't meant to be looked atthey wanted people to look at the text-actually supports the idea that it's
decent evidence of public original meaning because the audience is really the
authentic communication to other drafters of what it is they're trying to
accomplish.
Audience Question: The public relied on the Federalist Papers to do
an action, namely to ratify the Constitution. So, would you be willing to say
that the Federalist Papers could be more probative than the notes of Madison,
even though they are both probative, that the extent of publication has
something to say about the weight, the probative weight?
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Prof. Michael Stokes Paulsen: Let me briefly repeat the question. Is
the fact that the document was public in part of the debate, does that increase
its probative weight because of reliance, that people actually rely on it? The
problem: mine is not a reliance based theory. It's not that this is what was
said, and therefore, we are taking it as the meaning because someone said it thats sort of an "intentionalist" approach, and I think Scalia would have
resisted it. Mine is original meaning - that both sources are potentially
illustrative of the meaning the words would have had in social context to
reasonably informed speakers and readers of the English language at the time
they're debating it. You can't really rely on the Federalist Papers in saying
that people relied on that in deciding the meaning of the Constitution because
it's not clear that it changed the results-it was not read in most of the States.
It was addressed to the people of New York, and by the time New York got
around to ratifying, it was a late hit, and they ratified largely for political
reasons. You can't really tell why someone relied on a particular source.
Hon. Judge Sandra Ikuta: Other comments?
Prof. Lawrence Solum: I think audience is really important butjust in
a slightly different way. The Constitution is written for the public. It begins
with the three words, We the People.45 So, the relevant context and meaning
is the meaning of the constitutional text to the public at-large. Some statutes
work in exactly that way; some statutes are written for the whole public, but
other statutes have a much more specialized audience. Some statutes are
primarily written for the agency that will be engaging in the activities
authorized by the statute. So then, the relevant context of legislative
communication is not what would the public know about these words, it's
what would the intended audience, the agency, the lawyers involved in this
particular subdomain, make of these words; and that's really important. So,
the public documents surrounding the ratification of the Constitution are very
good and very direct evidence of public meaning, in the way that the secret
drafting history is still evidence, but it's evidence of a less direct sort. In the
statutory context, I think you have to analyze who is the audience of this
statute.

Hon. Judge Sandra Ikuta: Okay. Next question.
Audience Question: Going to Mr. Prakash's point, I understand that
45 U.S. CONST.
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a canny or, I guess I would say, a lawless judge can wrestle his or her way
around any theory of interpretation, but isn't it the case that it's harder to get
around a textual analysis in a plausible way? You can always find a purpose,
and you can find it in the context, in the newspaper, in the legislative history,
but the words are a little bit less yielding; and I know this will be
controversial, but isn't it the case that judges who want statutes to do more
tend to be purposive, and those who want them to do less tend to be textualists,
and doesn't that suggest that it is, in fact, harder to get around the words?
Thanks.
Prof. Saikrishna Prakash: I think that's a question for me. I think it's
ultimately an empirical question: whether or not willful judges need the
benefit of legislative history to do what they want to do or whether they could
do without it. Your comment made me think of the Eighth Amendment.4 6
The due process clause references life, liberty and property.47 Justice Scalia's
argument argued and to the death penalty, of course, you can have capital
punishment because the Constitution contemplates it, others disagree based
on the fact, I think, in part, that what is an "unusual punishment" isn't obvious
from the face of the Eighth Amendment. Moreover, the fact that the due
process clause permits the taking of life, is no answer to the question of
whether it's consistent with the Eighth Amendment. I've always found Justice
Scalia's argument convincing, but I take it that others don't, on a textual basis.
They think, somehow, the Eighth Amendment may have modified what
would be a permissible punishment if we conclude that the death penalty is a
cruel, unusual punishment. So, I take your point that there's this question
about whether or not people can be inventive enough in the absence of
legislative history, and I believe in the ingenuity of mankind, and I really
doubt that that's going to stop them.
Hon. Judge Sandra Ikuta: Other comments?
Prof. Thomas Merrill: Yeah. I agree with the premise of the question
because it seems to me, that in order to do whatever you want to do based on
simply the text, requires a tremendous amount of intellectual dexterity. So,
take King v. Burwell, the Affordable Care Act opinion where Chief Justice
Roberts writes this very lengthy opinion saying that to give a literal
interpretation of this one clause in the Affordable Care Act would violate,
what he called, the plan of the statute.48 He goes through page after page after
Id. at amend. VIII.
Sld. at amend. V.
" King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492-96.
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page of, sort of, explicating what he thinks the plan of the statute was, which
really means what the purpose of the statute was, and ifs an impressive effort.
You come away reading it, well, this is a really smart guy writing this opinion.
But I think that legislative history actually permits a much wider range of
judges, with lesser skills than Chief Justice Roberts, to pick and choose those
snippets from this bit of legislative history, that bit of legislative history, and
conjure up some kind of outcome that may be more congenial. So, I think
there is something to the point that using legislative history increases the
amount of data that judges have, and therefore, gives them more leeway,
particularly if they're not capable of doing some kind of Scalia-like or
Roberts-like whole-act kind of interpretation, which is extremely
intellectually clever, to achieve the results that they want to achieve. So, I
think that's right. One reason to do away with legislative history is it will, at
the margins, in cases where we don't have a lot of other interpretive material,
damp down on the range of outcomes that judges can reach.

Hon. Judge Sandra Ikuta: So, we actually only have time for one
question but since we have two people in line we're going to do speed
questions. So, could you please ask quick questions and we'll have a quick
answer.

Audience Question: I'm the City Attorney for Coral Gables, Florida.
My question was about executive interpretations, executive officers, Attorney
Generals, because of the nature of their roles. Since it's not judicial and it's
more tied to the democratic process, do you believe that when executive
officials interpret the law and apply it, do they have more leeway to look to
legislative history, or should they follow the same basic principles that ajudge
would?

Prof. Lawrence Solum: I have an answer to that question which is that
when they're engaged in actual interpretation their role is exactly the same.
But we frequently see executive officials and Congress engaging in what
Professor Barnett calls--double deference-that is, they say, well, this is my
interpretation of the statute and if I'm wrong the courts will correct me, and
then the courts say, well, we defer to what's gone on in Congress or the
executive branch, and that's really a problem.

Hon. Judge Sandra Ikuta: Last question.
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TEXT OVER INTENT

Audience Question: To the extent that legislative history can be used
to evince the original meaning of the text? What privilege is legislative
history over any other sort of learned debate at the time? Like, why are the
Federalist Papers more superior evidence of the meaning of the text at the
time than the debates of the Whig-Cliosophic Society or newspaper debates
in the New York Times and The Herald, or any other sort of intellectual debate
on the meaning of the texts, and if they don't have a privileged status over any
other contemporaneous contemporary intellectual learned debate on the
meaning of the texts, wouldn't that open up the universe of evidence that could
be used to interpret it so wide that, essentially, every blog post on the meaning
of "State" in King v. Burwell would have the same stature as the legislative
debates at the time?
Hon. Judge Sandra Ikuta: Response.
Prof. Michael Stokes Paulsen: I think that's directed to me. I think if
I understand the question correctly, the answer is, it is not privileged over
other learned public discussion contemporaneous with the time. I reference
this article my co-author Vasan Kasavan and I wrote called, The Interpretive
Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History. It's in Georgetown Law
Journal but one of the examples we raise is a hypothetical letter from John
Clergymen to Joel Farmer Parishioner in which there is a learned discussion
of the contemporaneous understanding of the meaning of the executive
power. We say, in principle, when we're talking a theory of trying to
understand the meanings of the words, all of these sources would be
potentially usable evidence. What makes the Federalist Papers especially
good is that they are especially good. It is a learned, topical concordance of
the discussion, very systematic, in the main reliable, and it was part of the
public debates. So, I think in principle, if you have an original meaning
jurisprudence, you potentially do have the problem of opening the world up
to more sources of evidence, of what counts as evidence of original meaning.
In that sense, it is less constraining but if you limit the uses to which such
evidence can be put, it is, I think, more constraining.
Hon. Judge Sandra Ikuta: This is a great way to end our panel. Could
you please join me in thanking a brilliant panel.
[END OF RECORDING]

